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Abstract
In his paper “Making Counterfactual Assumptions” Frank Veltman
has proposed a new semantics for counterfactual conditionals. It is based
on a particular update operation, and we show that it provides a new and
interesting way of updating logical databases under integrity constraints
which generalizes in particular Winslett’s PMA.
1 Introduction
In his paper “Making Counterfactual Assumptions” [Vel05] that is going to
appear in the J. of Semantics, Frank Veltman has proposed a new semantics
for counterfactual conditionals. The semantics contains a particular update
operation that we shall call “V-update” in the sequel.
We shall argue in this paper that beyond counterfactual conditionals, V-
update provides a new and interesting way of updating logical databases under
integrity constraints. The latter has been much debated in artificial intelligence
since the 90ies.
The present paper makes the following contributions.
• We show that V-update is a generalization of Winslett’s Possible Models
Approach (PMA).
• We show by means of examples that V-update does better than what has
been proposed in the field up to now, and discuss its limitations.
• We give a proof system for V-update and study its complexity.
• We study the logical principles that are satisfied by V-update (in particular
the Katsuno-Mendelzon postulates for updates).
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2 V-update
We here give a syntactic version of V-update.
First, let ATM = {p, q, . . .} be the (finite) set of atoms, and LIT = ATM ∪
{¬p : p ∈ ATM} the associated set of literals. A situation s is a consistent
set of literals. SIT is the set of all situations. A possible world w is a max-
imally consistent set of literals. W is the set of all (logically) possible worlds
[Vel05, Definition 1]. As ATM is finite we can safely identify sets of literals with
conjunctions of literals.
In Veltman’s paper, a cognitive state is a couple 〈Universe, Facts〉 such that
Facts ⊆ Universe and Universe ⊆ W . Universe is the set of worlds that are
compatible with the laws the agent is aware of, and Facts is the set of worlds
describing the current beliefs of the agent.
We here suppose that the universe and the facts are described by formulas
of propositional logic, noted A, B, C, D, . . . . The formula C corresponds to the
constraints of U , and B corresponds to the beliefs of Facts. Let [[A]] associate
to every formula A of propositional logic the set of all worlds where A holds.
Then [[C]] = Universe, [[B]] = Facts, and B ` C because Facts ⊆ Universe.
Veltman defines the notion of a basis for the possible world w within a set
of constraints C: “A basis for a world w ∈ [[C]] is a part of w consisting of
mutually independent facts which, given the general laws, bring the other facts
constituting w in their train” [Vel05, Definition 3]:
• basesC(w) = min⊆{s ∈ SIT : s ∧ C 6` ⊥, s ∧ C ` w}
Hence a basis for w within C is a minimal situation s ⊆ w such that s ∧ C is
consistent and s ∧ C ` w. (For all other situations s′ such that s′ ∧ C ` w and
s′ ⊆ s we have s′ = s.)
Example 1 {p} is a basis of {p, q} within p→ q.
basesp∨q({p, q}) = {{p, q}}
basesp∨q({¬p, q}) = {{¬p}}
basesp↔q({p, q}) = {{p}, {q}}
bases(p∧q)→r({p, q, r}) = {{p, q}}
bases(p∨q)→r({p, q, r}) = {{p}, {q}}
Remark 1 If there are no constraints (i.e. C = >) then the set of bases of w
is just {w}.
If [[C]] is a singleton then basesC(B) = {∅} = >.
We can also define the set of bases for the beliefs B:
• basesC(B) =
⋃
w∈[[B]] basesC(w)
For example, basesp→q(p↔ q) = {{p}, {¬q}}.
Then the orthogonal of w under C is:
• w ↓C A = max⊆{s′ : there is s ∈ basesC(w) such that s′ ⊆ s and
s′ ∧ C ∧A is consistent}
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Hence w ↓C A is the set of situations s′ that are maximal subsets of some basis
for w within C such that s′ ∧ C 6` A.
The V-contraction of w by A under constraints C is:
• w −VC A = [[
∨
w ↓C A]]
• w VIC A = (w −VIC A) ∩ [[A]]
Hence w −VC A is the set of those worlds w′ ∈ [[C]] such that s ⊆ w′ for some
s ∈ w ↓C A.
Remark 2 We have w −VC A ⊆ [[C]]. Hence C ` A implies w ↓C A = ∅.
Finally, the V-contraction and the the V-update of beliefs B by A under
constraints C are defined as follows.
• B −VC A =
⋃
w∈[[B]] w −VC A
• B VC A = (B −VC ¬A) ∩ [[A]] 1
This corresponds to Definition 4 in [Vel05].
The last item is the Levy identity that constructs a revision operation (that
is here better called an update operation) from a given contraction operation.
It follows from the above Remark 2 that B VC A = B VC (A ∧ C). This
illustrates that if C ∧A is inconsistent then B VC A is inconsistent, too.
3 No constraints: the PMA
In 1988 Mary-Anne Winslett proposed an operator for the update of logical
databases [Win88, Win90], the so-called Possible Models Approach (PMA). It
is based on minimization of the distance DIST between interpretations, where
the distance between two possible worlds w and v is the set of atoms whose
truth value differs:
DIST (w, v) = {p : w ∈ [[p]] and v 6∈ [[p]]} ∪ {p : w 6∈ [[p]] and v ∈ [[p]]}
For example suppose ATM = {p, q, r}, w = {p, q,¬r} and v = {p,¬q, r}. Then
DIST (w, v) = {q, r}.
Let A be the formula representing the incoming information (the input).
Then the update of a possible world w ∈W by [[A]] is defined as:
w W A = {u ∈ [[A]] : ∀u′ ∈ [[A]], DIST (w, u′) 6⊂ DIST (w, u)}.
In other terms, the set wWA contains all those elements of [[A]] that are minimal
w.r.t. the closeness ordering ≤w, where ≤w is defined by
u ≤w v iff DIST (w, u) ⊆ DIST (w, v).
1In [Vel05] B VC A is noted in terms of counterfactuals: 〈[[C]], [[B]]〉[if had been A]. (It is
also noted (1[2C][B])[if had been A].)
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Every ≤w is a partial pre-order over interpretations. In terms of conditional
logics this corresponds to a semantics a` la Burgess [Bur81].
Finally, the update of a set of worlds is defined as:
B W A =
⋃
w∈[[B]]
w W A
Then we have:
Theorem 1 For all propositional formulas B and A,
B V> A = B W A
Proof 1 It suffices to prove that w W A = (w −V> ¬A) ∩ [[A]].
Example 2 For w = {¬p,¬q} and A = p ∨ q, we have
[[A]] = {{p, q}, {¬p, q}, {p,¬q}}
Then DIST (w, {p, q}) = {p, q}, DIST (w, {¬p, q}) = {q}, and DIST (w, {p,¬q}) =
{p}. Thus the models of A which are minimal for distance set inclusion are
{{¬p, q}, {p,¬q}}. Hence we get
w W (p ∨ q) = {{¬p, q}, {p,¬q}}
If p is read “the butler was the murderer” and q “the gardener was the
murderer” then this illustrates that Sherlock Holmes cannot counterfactually
suspect the butler, or the gardener, or both.
The example illustrates that both for V and W, inclusive disjunctions might
be interpreted exclusively. This has been criticized in the literature, and several
solutions have been proposed that all try to relax the minimality of change
constraint, see [HR99] for an overview.
4 V-update as a new proposal for updating un-
der integrity constraints
V-update gives us a recipe for updating logical databases under integrity con-
straints. It does much better than the standard proposal [KM91, KM92], which
reduces updating under C to updating without integrity constraints by postu-
lating the identity
B C A = B > (A ∧ C)
The reason for that is that V takes C into account in a more sensible way.
This can be illustrated by Tichy’s example, where C = p→ q and B = p∧q.
We expect that when we update B by ¬p, then q does not persist (because it
depends on the truth of p through the integrity constraint p → q). V-update
gives us just this: (p ∧ (p→ q)) Vp→q ¬p = [[¬p]] (see example 4 in section 6 for
4
the proof). With the standard identity one would get (p ∧ (p→ q)) Vp→q ¬p =
(p ∧ (p→ q)) V> (¬p ∧ p→ q) With insensitivity to syntax the latter becomes
(p ∧ q) V> ¬p, which means that we have lost the connection between p and q
that is embodied in the integrity constraint p→ q: for V-updates (thus for and
W-updates) this yields ¬p ∧ q.
That V-updates behave better than the standard identity can be illustrated
as well by Veltman’s version Tichy2.
V-update also behaves better on conditionals with non-false antecedents.
For instance,
q Vp→q ¬p ↔ ¬p
while the standard proposal yields
(q ∧ (p→ q)) V> (¬p ∧ (p→ q)) ↔ ¬p ∧ q.
5 A limitation: the lack of causal information
Lifschitz’ lamp example [Lif86] (due to M. Ginsberg) illustrates the limitations
of V-update. It is similar to Kratzer’s King Ludwig example that is discussed
in [Vel05].
Example 3 Let p mean ‘switch 1 is up’, q ‘switch 2 is up’, and r ‘the light is
on’. Suppose there is a circuit such that the light is on exactly when both switches
are in the same position. Hence the integrity constraint is C = (p ↔ q) ↔ r.
Let B be p ∧ q ∧ r.
One would expect that BVC¬p→ ¬r. As well, we would expect BVC¬p→ q,
i.e. the second switch does not move. Neither is the case: first,
(p ∧ q ∧ r) V((p↔q)↔r) ¬p 6 |= ¬r
In words, it is not always the case that r gets false. Second,
(p ∧ q ∧ r) V((p↔q)↔r) ¬p 6 |= q
Hence q might change truth value, i.e. the second switch might ‘magically’ move.
Such examples turn out to be problematic for many approaches to updates
under integrity constraints. It has triggered a lot of research in AI on the
integration of some notion of causality into logical approaches to updates and
reasoning about actions. Basically, some linguistic means is introduced into the
language in order to be able to express that in our case p does not causally
depend on q, while r does.
It has been argued in [CGH99] that all these approaches are nevertheless
unsatisfactory. So it seems that this is still an open problem, as is also pointed
out in Veltman’s paper.
6 Automated deduction
The first step is to relate bases of worlds and formulas to prime implicants. The
latter are defined as follows [Mar00, CZ04]:
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• A situation s is an implicant of A if s ` A.
• s is a prime implicant of A if
– s is an implicant of A;
– for every implicant s′ of A, if s′ ⊆ s then s = s′.
We denote the set of prime implicants of a formula A by IP (a).
Theorem 2 basesC(w) = {s ∈ IP (C → w) : s is consistent with C}
Theorem 3 [[basesC(B)]] = [[{s ∈ IP (C → B) : s is consistent with C}]]
Note that basesC(B) is not always equal to {s ∈ IP (C → B) : s is consistent
with C}: if ATM = {p, q} then bases>(p) = {{p, q}, {p,¬q}}, while IP (> →
p) = {p}.
The next theorem is central. It says that V-update of B under constraint C
can be reduced to updating basesC(B) under the empty constraint >.
Theorem 4 B VC A = (basesC(B)) V> (A ∧ C)
Proof 2 As V-updates are done world by world it suffices to prove that wVCA =
(basesC(w)) V> (A ∧ C).
By definition,
w VC A = w −VC ¬A ∩ [[A]].
As noted in Remark 2, we have w −VC ¬A ⊆ [[C]]. Therefore
w VC A = w −VC ¬A ∩ [[A ∧ C]].
By the definition of contraction we then get
w VC A = [[
∧
(w ↓C ¬A)]] ∩ [[A ∧ C]].
By the definition of ↓C this is
w VC A =
⋃
s∈basesC(w)[[
∧
(max⊆{s′ ⊆ s : s′ ∧ C ∧A consistent})]] ∩ [[A ∧ C]].
This is nothing but
w VC A = (
⋃
s∈basesC(w)(s−V> (A ∧ C))) ∩ [[A ∧ C]].
Hence
w VC A =
⋃
s∈basesC(w) s V> (A ∧ C).
As we have seen, V> is just Winslett’s PMA update. Therefore, putting
everything together we obtain:
Corollary 1 B VC A = (basesC(B)) W (A ∧ C)
=
⋃
{s∈IP (C→B): s∧C 6`⊥} (s W (A ∧ C))
Hence it can be checked whether BVCA |= D by checking whether sW(A∧C) |=
D for every s ∈ IP (C → B) such that s ∧ C is consistent.
Remark 3 Note that B VC A 6= (C → B) W (A∧C). To see this it suffices to
take C = p∨q∨r, B = p∧q∧r, A = ¬p∨¬q∨¬r. Then BVCA = {{p∧q∧¬r}, {p∧
¬q ∧ r}, {¬p ∧ q ∧ r}, }, while (C → B) W (A ∧C) = [[p ∨ q ∨ r ∧ ¬p ∨ ¬q ∨ ¬r]]
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To sum it up, V-update can be computed by combining computation of
prime implicants with deduction in the PMA. Algorithms for the former can be
found in [Mar00], and for the latter in [EG92, HR99].
Example 4 Let C = p→ q, B = p ∧ q, and A = ¬p. Then basesp→q(p ∧ q) =
{p}. As A ∧ C ↔ ¬p, we obtain that
B VC A = (basesp→q(p ∧ q)) W (¬p ∧ (p→ q)) = p W ¬p = [[¬p]].
Example 5 Consider again Lifschitz’ lamp, where C = (p ↔ q) ↔ r and
B = p∧q∧r. IP (((p↔ q)↔ r)→ (p∧q∧r)) = {p∧q, p∧r, q∧r,¬p∧¬q∧¬r}.
The last element is inconsistent with C and is thus eliminated: basesC(B) =
{p ∧ q, p ∧ r, q ∧ r}. Then
(p ∧ q) W (¬p ∧ C) = {¬p ∧ q ∧ ¬r,¬p ∧ ¬q ∧ r}
This is also the result of (p ∧ r) W (¬p ∧ C) and of (q ∧ r) W (¬p ∧ C). Hence
(p ∧ q ∧ r) V((p↔q)↔r) ¬p = {¬p ∧ q ∧ ¬r,¬p ∧ ¬q ∧ r}.
Beyond this it would be interesting to have results on complexity.
7 The status of the KM update postulates
It is worth while investigating which of the standard logical principles for con-
ditionals hold for this operation, as well as which of the Katsuno-Mendelzon
postulates for updates are satisfied.
Conjecture 1 V-update validates the following principles for selection function
models a` la Stalnaker [Sta68].
(RU.EA) A1 ↔ A2B A1 ↔ B A2
(RU.EC) B1 ↔ B2B1 A ↔ B2 A
(RU.M) B1 → B2B1 A → B2 A
(U.M) B1 A ∨B2 A .→ (B1 ∨B2) A
(U.C) (B1 ∨B2) A → . B1 A ∨B2 A
These principles are the update counterparts of standard principles for condi-
tional logics2, cf. [RS97, Her98].
2These are:
(RC.EA) A1 ↔ A2
A12→C ↔ A22→C
(RC.EC) C1 ↔ C2
A2→C1 ↔ A2→C2
(RC.M) C1 → C2
A2→C1 → A2→C2
(C.M) A2→(C1 ∧ C2) .→ . A2→C1 ∧A2→C2
(C.C) A2→C1 ∧A2→C2 .→ . A2→(C1 ∧ C2)
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Conjecture 2 V-update moreover validates the following principles for partial
order models a` la Burgess [Bur81].
(U.ID) B A → A
(U.N) ¬(⊥ A)
(U.CA) B  (A1 ∨A2) → . B A1 ∨B A2
(RU.CSO) B A1 → A2 , B A2 → A1B A1 ↔ B A2
Again, these are the update counterparts of standard principles for condi-
tional logics.3
Conjecture 3 V-update validates
(U.MP) (B ∧A) → B A
(U.CS) (B ∧A) A → B
V-update does not validate CV, which characterizes total order models a` la
Lewis [Lew73]. In consequence, they do not validate the Katsuno-Mendelzon
postulates for updates [KM92].
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